Interlocking powers and federative cooperation: thoughts on the jurisprudential conception of cooperative federalism in times of political polarization

Abstract

A defining characteristic of cooperative federalism, as construed by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court, lies in the interlocking of powers and responsibilities across various levels of government. This configuration is regarded as a functional requirement for enhancing the cohesion of the federal arrangement. In contrast, scholars and political theorists have associated such interlocking with the cooperative model of federalism exemplified, above all, by the German experience. This article aims to examine how the Brazilian constitutional jurisprudence understands this institutional interlocking dynamics and to contrast it with key theoretical and doctrinal perspectives. Specifically, it investigates whether such federal arrangement is rooted in voluntary intergovernmental agreements that preserve the political autonomy of subnational units, or whether it takes on a mandatory basis that restricts their decision-making authority. The study also explores the implications of this dynamic in two critical domains: (a) the allocation of responsibility for jointly implemented policies and actions, and (b) the normative scope and modes of implementation of the constitutional duty to cooperate.